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Abstract
Background: In a previous study, we found that when required to imagine another person performing an action,
participants reported a higher correspondence between their own handedness and the hand used by the imagined person
when the agent was seen from the back compared to when the agent was seen from the front. This result was explained as
evidence of a greater involvement of motor areas in the back-view perspective, possibly indicating a greater proneness to
put oneself in the agent’s shoes in such a condition. In turn, the proneness to put oneself in another’s shoes could also be
considered as a cue of greater identification with the other, that is a form of empathy. If this is the case, the proportion of
lateral matches vs mismatches should be different for subjects with high and low self-reported empathy. In the present
study, we aimed at testing this hypothesis.
Methodology/Principal Findings: Participants were required to imagine a person performing a single manual action in a
back view and to indicate the hand used by the imagined person during movement execution. Consistent with our
hypothesis, the proportion of matching between the handedness of participants and the handedness of agents imagined
was higher for participants scoring high in a self-report measure of empathy. Importantly, this relationship was specific for
females.
Conclusions/Significance: At least for females, our data seem to corroborate the idea of a link between self-reported
empathy and motor identification with imagined agents. This sex-specific result is consistent with neuroimaging studies
indicating a stronger involvement of action representations during emotional and empathic processing in females than in
males. In sum, our findings underline the possibility of employing behavioral research as a test-bed for theories deriving
from functional studies suggesting a link between empathic processing and the activation of motor-related areas.
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Introduction
In general, the term empathy refers to the process of understand-
ing others’ mental and emotional states and reacting to them
appropriately, and involves both cognitive and emotional dimen-
sions [1,2]. According to Gallese [3], the establishment of a self-
other equivalence is crucial for the cognitive development of
complex forms of interpersonal relationships, including empathy.
Gallese proposed that some degree of identity is crucial in social
species, because it allows individuals to better predict the
consequences of others’ behavior: specifically, the attribution of
identity status to other subjects reduces the amount of information
that the brain has to process. Indeed, the same neural structures
involved in processing one’s own actions, sensations and emotions,
are thought to be active when those actions, sensations and
emotions are observed in others [4]. In line with this proposal, many
studies suggest that empathy might rely on an automatic activation
of the motor representation of the observed action [5–7]. Additional
evidence for the involvement of the motor system in empathic
processes is offered by studies indicating that the observation of
painful stimulations delivered to others is related to the simulation of
sensorimotor aspects of others’ experience, and that such a
modulation correlates positively with both the intensity of the pain
attributed to the observed model and the empathic tendencies of the
observer [8–12] (see [13] for consistent findings in a study engaging
participants with Asperger syndrome, a disorder characterized by
reduced or lacking empathy).
The notion of an automatic activation of motor representations
in empathic processes is further corroborated by the significant
association observed between self-reports of empathy and neural
activity in regions of the mirror neuron system (MNS) during
different tasks, and particularly during tasks involving emotion and
pain processing [14–21]. It has also been proposed that motor
simulation may be involved more in emotional than in cognitive
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 1 January 2011 | Volume 6 | Issue 1 | e14595
empathy [22], although a specific association between activity in
the MNS and self-reports of emotional rather than cognitive
empathy has not been demonstrated yet [16].
Finally, there is some evidence that impairments in empathizing
and/or mentalizing skills are related to deficits in visuospatial
perspective taking [23,24], and recent research suggests a
relationship between self-reported empathy and visuospatial
processing as measured by imagined self-other transformations,
biases in spatial attention and mental rotation of letters [25–27].
It is worth noting that the positive association between
empathic abilities and the recruitment of motor representations
is supported by much functional neuroimaging research, but few
behavioral studies have addressed this issue (e.g., [28]; see
[29,30] for consistent EMG results). The present investigation
aims at shedding more light on this topic. In a previous study
[31], we found that when required to imagine another person
performing an action, participants reported a higher correspon-
dence between their own handedness and the hand used by the
imagined agent when the agent was seen from the back
compared to when the agent was seen from the front. This
front-back difference seems to be consistent with research on
mental spatial transformation of human bodies and body parts,
which indicates 1) faster left–right judgements about human
bodies for figures presented with a back view than with a front
view, and 2) a crucial interaction between motor simulation and
hand dominance during the perception of bodies and body parts
[32–37]. In line with studies indicating an overlap between
neural structures involved in action production and in both self-
and other-related action imagination (e.g., [38–41]; for a review,
see [42]), we interpreted our result [31] as evidence of a greater
involvement of motor areas in the back-view perspective (which
we assume to be more readily assimilable to an egocentric view;
e.g., [43]), maybe indicating a greater proneness to put oneself in
the other’s shoes in such a condition. In this regard, we point out
that differential effects of viewing perspectives have been
observed for the activation of the MNS during the observation
of hands playing a competitive game [44], the somatosensory
cortices during the observation of touch [45], the extrastriate
body area during the observation of bodies and body parts
[46,47] and the temporoparietal junction during the mental
imagery of one’s own body [48,49], as well as for the illusion of
body ownership in virtual reality [50].
In our opinion, the proneness to put oneself in another’s shoes
could also be considered as a cue of greater identification with the
other, that is a form of empathy [1]. If this is the case, the
proportion of lateral matches vs mismatches during the
imagination of others’ actions should be different for subjects
with high and low self-reported empathy. Specifically, assuming
that a greater involvement of motor areas would result in higher
correspondence between one’s own handedness and the hand
used by the imagined agent, our prediction is strongly supported
by the aforementioned studies indicating a significant link
between empathy and the activation of motor representations.
In order to test our hypothesis, we devised a study in which
participants were asked to imagine a person – seen from behind –
performing a manual action and then to indicate the hand used
by the imagined agent by showing their own right or left hand. In
this study we examined exclusively the back-view perspective
because the involvement of motor representations is assumed to
be stronger compared to the front-view condition [31,43].
Participants were also required to complete the Interpersonal
Reactivity Index (IRI; [51]) and the Balanced Emotional
Empathy Scale (BEES; [52]), two of the most frequently used
questionnaires to assess empathy.
Methods
Imagination task
One of four experimenters (two females and two males)
approached 376 subjects (188 females and 188 males) aged
approximately 20–30 years in various locations on the University
campus, malls and other places where they could sit comfortably.
Since neither invasive nor risky procedures were involved and
since the data were analyzed anonymously, participants were
required to give only oral consent. The study was carried out in
accordance with the principles of the Declaration of Helsinki and
following the approval of the local ethical committee (Comitato
Etico d’Ateneo, Universita` ‘‘G. d’Annunzio’’ – Chieti).
The experimenter, standing in front of the participant, made
sure that the subject placed her/his hands palm-down on the knees
or on a table, and that she/he did not cross her/his legs, arms or
even fingers. Then the experimenter invited the participant to
close her/his eyes and to imagine a female or male person seen
from behind, without giving any further clue on the identity of the
person to be imagined. Once the participant stated to ‘see’ the
person, the experimenter asked her/him to imagine that the
person was performing an action. Thereafter, when the participant
stated to ‘see’ the person’s movement clearly, the experimenter
asked her/him to open her/his eyes and to indicate the hand used
by the person by showing her/his own right or left hand. Only one
trial was administered to each participant. The trial took around
3–4 minutes to be accomplished. In order to assess the
participant’s hand preference, she/he was administered the Italian
version of the Edinburgh Handedness Inventory [53], which
measures laterality as a continuous variable ranging from -1 to +1
(from complete left-handedness to complete right-handedness).
Three groups of participants were asked to imagine a person
performing one of these three actions: using scissors (120 subjects),
using a toothbrush (112 subjects) or using a spoon (144 subjects).
Each group was composed of an identical number of:
– females imagining a female person;
– females imagining a male person;
– males imagining a female person;
– males imagining a male person.
Only subjects who were able to ‘see’ the person and the person’s
movement and to clearly indicate a definite (right or left) hand for
the imagined action were included in the study. Of all subjects who
succeeded in performing the task, none spontaneously reported
having imagined her/himself as the person performing the
movement, and only few subjects reported having imagined a
familiar person.
Self-reported empathy
After completing the handedness questionnaire, participants
were administered the Italian versions of the Interpersonal
Reactivity Index (IRI; [54]) and the Balanced Emotional Empathy
Scale (BEES; [55]).
The IRI [51] is a 28-item questionnaire consisting of four
discrete, seven-item subscales assessing different dimensions of
empathy: Perspective Taking (PT), Fantasy (FS), Empathic
Concern (EC), and Personal Distress (PD).
The BEES [52] is a 30-item questionnaire that assesses the
tendency to share the emotional experiences of others, and
represents a measure of emotional empathy.
More detailed descriptions of both questionnaires are available
as Supporting Information (Text S1).
Empathy & Motor Identification
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Data analysis
According to the laterality score obtained in the Italian version
of the Edinburgh Handedness Inventory [53], the 376 participants
were divided into two categories: right-handers (345 subjects with
a positive laterality score [range: 0.04/1.00; M=0.6760.013
SEM]) or left-handers (30 subjects with a negative laterality score
[range: 21.00/20.03; M=20.5560.052 SEM]). One female
participant with a laterality score equal to 0 was excluded from
data analyses.
As in our previous study [31], the proportion of matches vs
mismatches between participants’ dominant hand and the hand
used by the imagined agent did not differ across actions
(x2 = 1.623, d.f. = 2, p = 0.444; Table 1), so we did not consider
the variable Action in the following analyses.
Imagination task. Chi-square tests were used 1) to compare
the proportion of matches vs mismatches between the handedness
of participants and the handedness of the imagined agent in right-
and left-handed participants and 2) to examine the possible effect
of both the participants’ sex and the correspondence between the
participants’ sex and the imagined agent’s sex on the proportion of
lateral matches vs mismatches.
IRI susbscales. In addition to the female participant with a
laterality score equal to 0, in the analyses of the IRI scores we
excluded 24 female participants and 26 male participants who
either did not respond to one or more items of any IRI subscale or
scored more than 2 standard deviations above or below the mean in
any IRI subscale according to their ‘Sex x Lateral Correspondence’
group (i.e., females and males who imagined the action being
performed with their dominant or non-dominant hand).
A multivariate analysis of variance was performed on all IRI
subscales: PT, FS, EC and PD. The independent variables were
Participant’s Sex (female, male) and Lateral Correspondence
between the participant’s dominant hand and the hand used by
the imagined agent (same hand, different hand). Because of the
low number of left-handed participants (n = 20) available for this
analysis, it was not possible to include handedness (i.e., left or right
manual dominance) as an independent variable. Consequently,
Laterality Score (as measured by the Italian version of the
Edinburgh Handedness Inventory) was included as a covariate.
BEES. In addition to the female participant with a laterality
score equal to 0, in the analyses of the BEES scores we excluded 9
female participants and 14 male participants who either did not
respond to one or more items or scored more than 2 standard
deviations above or below the mean according to their ‘Sex x
Lateral Correspondence’ group (i.e., females and males who
imagined the action being performed with their dominant or non-
dominant hand).
A univariate analysis of variance was performed on the BEES.
The independent variables were Participant’s Sex (female, male)
and Lateral Correspondence between the participant’s dominant
hand and the hand used by the imagined agent (same hand,
different hand). Because of the low number of left-handed
participants (n = 27) available for this analysis, it was not possible
to include handedness (i.e., left or right manual dominance) as an
independent variable. Consequently, Laterality Score (as mea-
sured by the Italian version of the Edinburgh Handedness
Inventory) was included as a covariate.
Results
Imagination task
Compared to a chance distribution (50%), right-handers
imagined a higher proportion of right- than left-handed actions
(313 vs 32 [90.7%]; x2 = 228.872, d.f. = 1, p,0.001), while left-
handers imagined a larger proportion of left- than right-handed
actions, although this difference was not significant (17 vs 13
[56.7%]; x2 = 0.533, d.f. = 1, p = 0.465). Moreover, right-handers
showed a larger proportion of matches vs mismatches between
their dominant hand and the hand used by the imagined agent
compared to left-handers (x2 = 27.177 [Continuity Correction
Applied, from now on: CCA], d.f. = 1, p,0.001).
The proportion of matches vs mismatches did not differ
according to either the participants’ sex (females: 162 vs 25
[86.6%]; males: 168 vs 20 [89.4%]; x2 = 0.429 [CCA], d.f. = 1,
p = 0.513) or the correspondence between the participants’ sex and
the imagined agent’s sex (same sex: 167 vs 21 [88.8%]; opposite
sex: 163 vs 24 [87.2%]; x2 = 0.113 [CCA], d.f. = 1, p = 0.736).
When participants were divided according to their lateral
preference for the specific action imagined (using scissors, using a
toothbrush, or using a spoon) as declared in the handedness
questionnaire rather than total laterality score obtained by
considering all items, results were almost identical. However, this
choice would have entailed the loss of 30 participants who
indicated no lateral preference for the particular action imagined,
so we decided to report only the results of analyses employing total
laterality score as the criterion for defining handedness.
IRI susbscales
The only significant effect was that of Sex (F4,317 = 3.281;
p,0.05). Post hoc univariate analyses showed that females
(n = 163) scored significantly higher than males (n = 162) in the
EC subscale (Mf = 28.63 vs Mm=25.77; F1,320 = 10.472;
p,0.005), and a statistical trend in the same direction was
observed in the PD subscale (Mf = 19.32 vs Mm=17.44;
F1,320 = 3.108; p= 0.079), while there were no differences in the
PT subscale (Mf = 25.89 vs Mm=24.12; F1,320 = 1.165; p= 0.281)
and in the FS subscale (Mf = 24.49 vs Mm=22.45; F1,320 = 2.368;
p = 0.125; Figure 1).
BEES
Statistical analyses showed significant main effects of both Sex
(F1,347 = 13.798; p,0.001) and Lateral Correspondence
(F1,347 = 4.023; p,0.05): females scored higher (n = 178;
M=37.56) than males (n = 174; M=18.93), and participants
who imagined the action being performed with their dominant
hand scored higher (n = 309; M=29.17) than those who imagined
the action being performed with their non-dominant hand (n= 43;
M=22.44).
A significant interaction between Sex and Lateral Correspon-
dence (F1,347 = 10.467; p,0.005) showed that the previous results
were due to females who imagined the action being performed
with their dominant hand scoring significantly higher (n = 154;
M=39.79) than all the other groups (females, non-dominant:
n = 24, M=23.25; males, dominant: n = 155, M=18.62; males,
non-dominant: n = 19, M=21.42; all ps,0.001; p values adjusted
Table 1. Proportion of matches vs mismatches between
participants’ dominant hand and the hand used by the
imagined agent for the different actions.
Action Matches Mismatches
Using scissors 102 17
Using a toothbrush 102 10
Using a spoon 126 18
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0014595.t001
Empathy & Motor Identification
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with the Tukey-Kramer method), while there were no differences
between these latter groups (Figure 2).
Discussion
Imagination task
With regard to participants’ responses in the imagination task,
the present results confirm those of our previous study [31]: 1)
both right-handers and left-handers preferentially imagined
actions performed with their dominant rather than non-dominant
hand (although this difference was significant only for right-
handers, possibly because the number of left-handed participants
was not sufficient to detect a rather moderate difference); 2)
compared to left-handers, right-handers reported a larger
proportion of matches between their dominant hand and the
hand used by the imagined agent. As already proposed [31], the
lower proportion of matches vs mismatches in left-handers may be
attributed to both their greater visual familiarity with actions
performed with their non-dominant hand (inducing an incongru-
ence between the visual experience of others’ actions and one’s
Figure 1. Female and male participants’ scores on the IRI subscales (PT: Perspective Taking; FS: Fantasy; EC: Empathic Concern; PD:
Personal Distress).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0014595.g001
Figure 2. BEES scores as a function of Sex and Lateral Correspondence (D: dominant hand; ND: non-dominant hand).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0014595.g002
Empathy & Motor Identification
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own experience of self-made actions) and their lower average
absolute degree of lateralization, in line with previous research
showing handedness-related differences with regard to motor
representations in both behavioral and functional measures
[56–58].
Self-reported empathy
Compared to males, females exhibited higher empathy scores,
and the difference was particularly significant for the emotional
component of empathy, as apparent in participants’ responses to
the IRI EC subscale and the BEES. This is consistent with past
research employing self-report data [59–61].
Our results provide good (albeit not complete) support for the
hypothesis that participants imagining actions performed with
their dominant hand would exhibit higher empathy compared to
those imagining actions performed with their non-dominant hand.
In fact, the effect of lateral correspondence was due exclusively to
women, because female participants who imagined actions
performed with their dominant hand scored higher on the BEES
than all other groups, which did not differ between each other.
If one assumes that the lateral congruence between one’s own
and an imagined agent’s handedness can be considered as
indicative of a greater involvement of motor areas compared to
the lateral incongruence, our results are consistent with previous
research suggesting a link between empathic tendencies and the
activation of motor-related areas [14–19,28–30]. In particular, it
is important to note that much research indicates a stronger
activation of motor representations during emotional and
empathic processes in women than in men. For example,
females exhibit more pronounced and more congruent facial
electromyographic reactions to observed facial expressions than
males [62–64]. Compared to men, women show enhanced MNS
activation during emotional perspective taking, which may be
related to gender differences in the tendency to exhibit facial
mimicry [65]. Moreover, during the simple observation of leg
and hand movements as well as during the observation of body
parts in both painful and non-painful situations, activity in the
MNS (as indicated by mu rhythm suppression) is stronger in
females than in males [66–69]. Interestingly, there is some
evidence that such activity is positively correlated with self-
reports of empathy in females but not in males (i.e., painful
condition in [69]; for congruent findings, see [70]). Overall, these
studies strongly suggest that females activate motor-related areas
more than males during emotional and empathic processing,
consistent with neuroimaging research indicating that females
and males rely on different neural strategies for these tasks (e.g.,
[71–75]).
Furthermore, females and males report using respectively
egocentric strategies and object-based strategies when performing
visuospatial perspective-taking tasks, and these preferences appear
to be associated with the recruitment of specific brain regions
[26,76]. Congruent differences are also found for egocentric
mental rotation of hands, females relying more on imitation or
perceptual comparisons (as suggested by stronger activity in the left
ventral premotor cortex), and males relying more on early visual
or semantic processing (as suggested by stronger activity in the
lingual gyrus) [77]. Moreover, females seem to engage more
emotion and self-related processes and males more cognitive
processes during tasks involving both affective and cognitive
empathy, even in the absence of significant gender differences in
behavioral performance [78]. Finally, an intriguing instance of
more strongly embodied representations in females than in males
can be observed in giving route directions, a task in which women
are more concrete and personal, using landmarks and left–right
terms, whereas men are more abstract and Euclidean, using
cardinal directions and metric distances [79] (see also [80], for an
interesting correlation between anxiety during environmental
navigation and way-finding strategies). In sum, it is plausible that
the gender-specific result found in our study may be a consequence
of the stronger involvement, in more empathic females, of motor-
and self-related processes, which could result in more body-specific
(see [81]) and ‘concrete’ imagery.
Noteworthy, a significant link between the hand used by the
imagined agent and self-reports of empathy was found when
examining the BEES [52] scores, but not when examining any IRI
[51] subscale scores. This result makes sense if one considers that
different dimensions of empathy are measured by these instruments.
In fact, as regards the IRI [51], while the PT and FS subscales assess
cognitive empathy, the EC subscale assesses the tendency to
sympathize with and be concerned about others, and the PD subscale
assesses the tendency to feel negative emotions in response to others’
distress. On the other hand, the BEES [52] assesses the tendency to
vicariously experience both positive and negative emotions of others,
and thus could provide a more specific measure of affective sharing.
Therefore, compared to any IRI subscale, the BEES might prove to
be a more sensitive marker of the tendency to engage motor
representations, because affective empathy seems to activate motor-
related areas more intensely than cognitive empathy [22].
Since, in line with some studies reporting a left hemisphere
dominance for empathic abilities in right-handers [26,82], we
observed a positive correlation between female participants’
laterality scores and BEES scores (see Supporting Information,
Text S2 and Figure S1) and, in line with our previous study [31],
absolute laterality score was positively associated with the likelihood
to imagine an action performed with one’s own dominant rather
than non-dominant hand (see Supporting Information, Text S3),
the positive association between lateral correspondence and the
BEES scores observed in our female participants might be
attributed to the covariance of both these variables with laterality
scores, the great majority of our participants being right-handed.
However, this possibility can be ruled out because a significant
interaction between Sex and Lateral Correspondence was also
found when the analysis (employing Laterality Score as a covariate)
was carried out for right-handers only (see Supporting Information,
Text S3 and Figure S2).
A possible concern regarding the procedure used to investigate
our hypotheses could consist in the fact that we asked our subjects to
‘see’ an imagined person performing an action, which might
seemingly engage visual rather than motor imagery. Since visual
imagery is usually associated with brain areas – mainly not motor –
different from those associated with motor imagery (e.g., [83,84]),
one could wonder why a visual imagery task should have tapped
motor representations (and thus the allegedly motor neural basis of
empathic abilities). However, we point out that, as well as during
others’ action perception (see [42] for a review), the activation of
motor representations is found during the imagination of not only
one’s own (e.g., [39,41]) but also of others’ movements (e.g., [40]). In
particular, as regards the link between empathic abilities and the
recruitment of motor representations, a positive correlation between
self-reports of empathy and neural activity in regions of the MNS
has been reported for different tasks, including tasks which might
involve mainly visual representations (i.e., the observation of
pleasant and unpleasant emotions [17]) or even the mere
imagination of others’ behavior (i.e., the anticipation of others’
emotional responses [15]). So, it is plausible that empathic
tendencies could affect performance in an imagination task which
is deemed to involve one’s own motor representations [40] (see also
[31] for consistent behavioral results).
Empathy & Motor Identification
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In conclusion, the present study corroborates our hypothesis
that self-reported empathy is positively linked to the activation of
motor representations while imagining another person performing
an action. However, this relationship seems to be present only in
female subjects, consistent with previous research indicating a
stronger involvement of action representations during emotional
and empathic processing in females than in males [62–65]. In
other words, compared to male participants, female participants
were likely to use more self- and motor-related representations
during the imagination task, which is consistent with neuroimaging
findings on gender-specific neural activity during both visuospatial
and emotional perspective taking [65,76,78].
Finally, our results underline the possibility of employing
behavioral research as a test-bed for theories deriving from
functional studies. Conversely, a possible extension of this study
could consist in employing neuroimaging techniques such as fMRI
and TMS in order to test the proposed correlation between self-
reported empathy and body-specific motor representations [81]
during others’ action imagination.
Supporting Information
Text S1. Empathy questionnaires description.
Found at: doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0014595.s001 (0.04 MB
DOC)
Text S2. Correlation between empathic tendencies and hemi-
spheric lateralization.
Found at: doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0014595.s002 (0.04 MB
DOC)
Text S3. BEES analysis for right-handed participants.
Found at: doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0014595.s003 (0.04 MB
DOC)
Figure S1. Scatterplots of Laterality Score and BEES for female
and male right-handed participants.
Found at: doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0014595.s004 (1.88 MB TIF)
Figure S2. BEES scores as a function of Sex and Lateral
Correspondence (D: dominant hand; ND: non-dominant hand) for
right-handed participants.
Found at: doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0014595.s005 (0.77 MB TIF)
Author Contributions
Conceived and designed the experiments: DM LT. Performed the
experiments: RP ADD BP PG. Analyzed the data: DM RP ADD BP
PG. Contributed reagents/materials/analysis tools: LT. Wrote the paper:
DM LT.
References
1. Davis MH (1996) Empathy: A social psychological approach. Boulder: Westview
Press.
2. Leiberg S, Anders S (2006) The multiple facets of empathy: A survey of theory
and evidence. Prog Brain Res 156: 419–440.
3. Gallese V (2003) The manifold nature of interpersonal relations: The quest for a
common mechanism. Philos T Roy Soc B 358: 517–528.
4. Gallese V (2001) The ‘shared manifold’ hypothesis: From mirror neurons to
empathy. J Consciousness Stud 8: 33–50.
5. Carr L, Iacoboni M, Dubeau MC, Mazziotta JC, Lenzi GL (2003) Neural
mechanisms of empathy in humans: A relay from neural systems for imitation to
limbic areas. P Natl Acad Sci USA 29: 5497–5502.
6. Leslie KR, Johnson-Frey SH, Grafton ST (2004) Functional imaging of face and
hand imitation: Towards a motor theory of empathy. NeuroImage 21: 601–
607.
7. Wild B, Erb M, Eyb M, Bartels M, Grodd W (2003) Why are smiles contagious?
An fMRI study of the interaction between perception of facial affect and facial
movements. Psychiat Res-Neuroim 123: 17–36.
8. Avenanti A, Bueti D, Galati G, Aglioti SM (2005) Transcranial magnetic
stimulation highlights the sensorimotor side of empathy for pain. Nat Neurosci 8:
955–960.
9. Avenanti A, Minio-Paluello I, Bufalari I, Aglioti SM (2006) Stimulus-driven
modulation of motor-evoked potentials during observation of others’ pain.
NeuroImage 32: 316–324.
10. Avenanti A, Minio-Paluello I, Bufalari I, Aglioti SM (2009) The pain of a model
in the personality of an onlooker: Influence of state-reactivity and personality
traits on embodied empathy for pain. NeuroImage 44: 275–283.
11. Bufalari I, Aprile T, Avenanti A, Di Russo F, Aglioti SM (2007) Empathy for
pain and touch in the human somatosensory cortex. Cereb Cortex 17:
2553–2561.
12. Costantini M, Galati G, Romani GL, Aglioti SM (2008) Empathic neural
reactivity to noxious stimuli delivered to body parts and non-corporeal objects.
Eur J Neurosci 28: 1222–1230.
13. Minio-Paluello I, Baron-Cohen S, Avenanti A, Walsh V, Aglioti SM (2009)
Absence of embodied empathy during pain observation in Asperger syndrome.
Biol Psychiat 65: 55–62.
14. Gazzola V, Aziz-Zadeh L, Keysers C (2006) Empathy and the somatotopic
auditory mirror system in humans. Curr Biol 16: 1824–1829.
15. Hooker CI, Verosky SC, Germine LT, Knight RT, D’Esposito M (2008)
Mentalizing about emotion and its relationship to empathy. Soc Cogn Affect
Neur 3: 204–217.
16. Hooker CI, Verosky SC, Germine LT, Knight R T, D’Esposito M (2010) Neural
activity during social signal perception correlates with self-reported empathy.
Brain Res 1308: 100–113.
17. Jabbi M, Swart M, Keysers C (2007) Empathy for positive and negative
emotions in the gustatory cortex. NeuroImage 34: 1744–1753.
18. Pfeifer JH, Iacoboni M, Mazziotta JC, Dapretto M (2008) Mirroring others’
emotions relates to empathy and interpersonal competence in children.
NeuroImage 39: 2076–2085.
19. Schulte-Ru¨ther M, Markowitsch HJ, Fink GR, Piefke M (2007) Mirror neuron
and theory of mind mechanisms involved in face-to-face interactions: A
functional magnetic resonance imaging approach to empathy. J Cognitive
Neurosci 19: 1354–1372.
20. Saarela MV, Hlushchuk Y, Williams ACdC, Schurmann M, Kalso E, et al.
(2007) The compassionate brain: Humans detect intensity of pain from another’s
face. Cereb Cortex 17: 230–237.
21. Singer T, Seymour B, O’Doherty J, Kaube H, Dolan RJ, et al. (2004) Empathy
for pain involves the affective but not sensory components of pain. Science 303:
1157–1162.
22. Nummenmaa L, Hirvonen J, Parkkola R, Hietanen JK (2008) Is emotional
contagion special? An fMRI study on neural systems for affective and cognitive
empathy. NeuroImage 43: 571–580.
23. Hamilton AF, Brindley R, Frith U (2009) Visual perspective taking impairment
in children with autistic spectrum disorder. Cognition 113: 37–44.
24. Langdon R, Coltheart M (2001) Visual perspective-taking and schizotypy:
Evidence for a simulation-based account of mentalizing in normal adults.
Cognition 82: 1–26.
25. Mohr C, Rowe AC, Blanke O (2010) The influence of sex and empathy on
putting oneself in the shoes of others. Brit J Psychol 101: 277–291.
26. Thakkar KN, Brugger P, Park S (2009) Exploring empathic space: Correlates of
perspective transformation ability and biases in spatial attention. PLoS ONE 4:
e5864. doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0005864.
27. Thakkar KN, Park S (2010) Empathy, schizotypy and visuospatial transforma-
tions. Cogn Neuropsychiatry 15: 477–500.
28. Chartrand TL, Bargh JA (1999) The chameleon effect: The perception–
behavior link and social interaction. J Pers Soc Psychol 76: 893–910.
29. Sonnby-Borgstro¨m M (2002) Automatic mimicry reactions as related to
differences in emotional empathy. Scand J Psychol 43: 433–443.
30. Sonnby-Borgstro¨m M, Jo¨nsson P, Svensson O (2003) Emotional empathy as
related to mimicry reactions at different levels of information processing.
J Nonverbal Behav 27: 3–23.
31. Marzoli D, Mitaritonna A, Moretto F, Carluccio P, Tommasi L (2010) The
handedness of imagined bodies in action and the role of perspective taking.
Brain Cogn 75: 51–59.
32. Blanke O, Ionta S, Fornari E, Mohr C, Maeder P (2010) Mental imagery for full
and upper human bodies: Common right hemisphere activations and distinct
extrastriate activations. Brain Topogr 23: 321–332.
33. Gardner M, Potts R (2010) Hand dominance influences the processing of
observed bodies. Brain Cogn 73: 35–40.
34. Ionta S, Fourkas A, Fiorio M, Aglioti SM (2007) The influence of hands posture
on mental rotation of hands and feet. Exp Brain Res 183: 1–7.
35. Parsons LM (1987a) Imagined spatial transformation of one’s body. J Exp
Psychol Gen 116: 172–191.
36. Parsons LM (1987b) Imagined spatial transformations of one’s hands and feet.
Cogn Psychol 19: 178–241.
37. Parsons LM (1994) Temporal and kinematic properties of motor behavior reflected
in mentally simulated action. J Exp Psychol Hum Percept Perform 20: 709–730.
Empathy & Motor Identification
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 6 January 2011 | Volume 6 | Issue 1 | e14595
38. Decety J, Perani D, Jeannerod M, Bettinardi V, Tadary B, et al. (1994) Mapping
motor representations with positron emission tomography. Nature 371:
600–602.
39. Grafton ST, Arbib MA, Fadiga L, Rizzolatti G (1996) Localization of grasp
representations in humans by positron emission tomography. Exp Brain Res
112: 103–111.
40. Ruby P, Decety J (2001) Effect of subjective perspective taking during simulation
of action: A PET investigation of agency. Nat Neurosci 4: 546–550.
41. Stephan KM, Fink GR, Passingham RE, Silbersweig D, Ceballos-Baumann O,
et al. (1995) Functional anatomy of the mental representation of upper extremity
movements in health subjects. J Neurophysiol 73: 373–386.
42. Gre`zes J, Decety J (2001) Functional anatomy of execution, mental simulation,
observation, and verb generation of actions: A meta-analysis. Hum Brain Mapp
12: 1–19.
43. Jackson PL, Meltzoff AN, Decety J (2006) Neural circuits involved in imitation
and perspective-taking. NeuroImage 31: 429–439.
44. Shimada S, Abe R (2010) Outcome and view of the player modulate motor area
activity during observation of a competitive game. Neuropsychologia 48:
1930–1934.
45. Schaefer M, Xu B, Flor H, Cohen LG (2009) Effects of different viewing
perspectives on somatosensory activations during observation of touch. Hum
Brain Mapp 30: 2722–2730.
46. Chan AWY, Peelen MV, Downing PE (2004) The effect of viewpoint on body
representation in the extrastriate body area. NeuroReport 15: 2407–2410.
47. Saxe R, Jamal N, Powell L (2006) My body or yours? The effect of visual
perspective on cortical body representation. Cereb Cortex 16: 178–182.
48. Arzy S, Thut G, Mohr C, Michel CM, Blanke O (2006) Neural basis of
embodiment: Distinct contributions of temporoparietal junction and extrastriate
body area. J Neurosci 26: 8074–8081.
49. Blanke O, Mohr C, Michel CM, Pascual-Leone A, Brugger P, et al. (2005)
Linking out-of-body experience and self processing to mental own-body imagery
at the temporoparietal junction. J Neurosci 25: 550–557.
50. Slater M, Spanlang B, Sanchez-Vives MV, Blanke O (2010) First Person
Experience of Body Transfer in Virtual Reality. PLoS ONE 5: e10564.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0010564.
51. Davis MH (1980) A multidimensional approach to individual differences in
empathy. JSAS Catalog of Selected Documents in Psychology 10: 85.
52. Mehrabian A (1997) Relation among personality scales of aggression, violence,
and empathy: validational evidence bearing on the Risk Eruptive Violence
Scale. Aggressive Behav 23: 433–445.
53. Salmaso D, Longoni AM (1985) Problems in the assessment of hand preference.
Cortex 21: 533–549.
54. Albiero P, Ingoglia S, Lo Coco A (2006) Contributo all’adattamento italiano
dell’Interpersonal Reactivity Index [A contribution to the Italian validation of
the Interpersonal Reactivity Index]. TPM 13: 107–125.
55. Meneghini AM, Sartori R, Cunico L (2006) Adattamento e validazione su
campione italiano della Balanced Emotional Empathy Scale di A. Mehrabian
[Adaptation and validation of the Balanced Emotional Empathy Scale of A.
Mehrabian on an Italian sample]. Ricerche di Psicologia 29: 123–152.
56. Ionta S, Blanke O (2009) Differential influence of hands posture on mental
rotation of hands and feet in left and right handers. Exp Brain Res 195:
207–217.
57. Lewis JW, Phinney RE, Brefczynski-Lewis JA, DeYoe EA (2006) Lefties get it
‘‘right’’ when hearing tool sounds. J Cognitive Neurosci 18: 1314–1330.
58. Solodkin A, Hlustik P, Noll DC, Small SL (2001) Lateralization of motor circuits
and handedness during finger movements. Eur J Neurol 8: 425–434.
59. Baron-Cohen S, Wheelwright S (2004) The empathy quotient: An investigation
of adults with Asperger syndrome or high functioning autism, and normal sex
difference. J Autism Dev Disord 34: 163–175.
60. Eisenberg N, Lennon R (1983) Sex differences in empathy and related
capacities. Psychol Bull 94: 100–131.
61. Hoffman ML (1977) Sex differences in empathy and related behaviors. Psychol
Bull 84: 712–722.
62. Dimberg U, Lundqvist O (1990) Gender differences in facial reactions to facial
expressions. Biol Psychol 30: 151–159.
63. Lundqvist LO (1995) Facial EMG reactions to facial expressions: A case of
emotional contagion? Scand J Psychol 36: 130–141.
64. Sonnby-Borgstro¨m M, Jo¨nsson P, Svensson O (2008) Gender differences in facial
imitation and verbally reported emotional contagion from spontaneous to
emotionally regulated processing levels. Scand J Psychol 49: 111–122.
65. Schulte-Ru¨ther M, Markowitsch HJ, Shah NJ, Fink GR, Piefke M (2008)
Gender differences in brain networks supporting empathy. NeuroImage 42:
393–403.
66. Cheng Y, Decety J, Lin CP, Hsieh JC, Hung D, et al. (2007) Sex differences in
the spinal excitability during observation of bipedal locomotion. NeuroReport
18: 887–890.
67. Cheng Y, Lee PL, Yang CY, Lin CP, Hung D, et al. (2008) Gender differences
in the mu rhythm of the human mirror-neuron system. PLoS ONE 3: e2113.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0002113.
68. Cheng Y, Tzeng OJL, Decety J, Imada T, Hsieh JC (2006) Gender differences in
the human mirror system: A magnetoencephalography. NeuroReport 17:
1115–1119.
69. Yang CY, Decety J, Lee S, Chen G, Cheng Y (2009) Gender differences in the
mu rhythm during empathy for pain: An electroencephalographic study. Brain
Res 1251: 176–184.
70. Han S, Fan Y, Mao L (2008) Gender difference in empathy for pain: An
electrophysiological investigation. Brain Res 1196: 85–93.
71. Fukushima H, Hiraki K (2006) Perceiving an opponent’s loss: Gender-related
differences in the medial-frontal negativity. Soc Cogn Affect Neurosci 1:
149–157.
72. Harenski CL, Antonenko O, Shane MS, Kiehl KA (2008) Gender differences in
neural mechanisms underlying moral sensitivity. Soc Cogn Affect Neurosci 3:
313–321.
73. Proverbio AM, Zani A, Adorni R (2008) Neural markers of a greater female
responsiveness to social stimuli. BMC Neurosci 9: 56.
74. Proverbio AM, Adorni R, Zani A, Trestianu L (2009) Sex differences in the
brain response to affective scenes with or without humans. Neuropsychologia 47:
2374–2388.
75. Singer T, Seymour B, O’Doherty J, Stephan KE, Dolan RJ, et al. (2006)
Empathic neural responses are modulated by the perceived fairness of others.
Nature 439: 466–469.
76. Kaiser S, Walther S, Nennig E, Kronmuller K, Mundt C, et al. (2008) Gender-
specific strategy use and neural correlates in a spatial perspective taking task.
Neuropsychologia 46: 2524–2531.
77. Seurink R, Vingerhoets FP, Achten E (2004) Does egocentric mental rotation
elicit sex differences? NeuroImage 23: 1440–1449.
78. Derntl B, Finkelmeyer A, Eickhoff SB, Kellermann T, Falkenberg DI, et al.
(2010) Multidimensional assessment of empathic abilities: Neural correlates and
gender differences. Psychoneuroendocrino 35: 67–82.
79. Dabbs JM, Chang EL, Strong RA, Milun R (1998) Spatial ability, navigation
strategy, and geographic knowledge among men and women. Evol Hum Behav
19: 89–98.
80. Lawton CA (1994) Gender differences in way-finding strategies: Relationship to
spatial ability and spatial anxiety. Sex Roles 30: 765–779.
81. Willems RM, Toni I, Hagoort P, Casasanto D (2009) Body-specific motor
imagery of hand actions: Neural evidence from right-and left-handers. Front
Hum Neurosci 3: 1–9.
82. Minio-Paluello I, Avenanti A, Aglioti SM (2006) Left hemisphere dominance in
reading the sensory qualities of others’ pain? Soc Neurosci 1: 320–333.
83. Sirigu A, Duhamel JR (2001) Motor and visual imagery as two complementary
but neurally dissociable mental processes. J Cognitive Neurosci 13: 910–919.
84. Pelgrims B, Andres M, Olivier E (2009) Double dissociation between motor and
visual imagery in the posterior parietal cortex. Cereb Cortex 19: 2298–2307.
Empathy & Motor Identification
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 7 January 2011 | Volume 6 | Issue 1 | e14595
